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Abstract 
This paper analyses the regulatory framework governing deceased organ donation in New 
Zealand. In particular, it provides an overview of the reform process that led to the Human 
Tissue Act 2008. By examining the complex issues that arise in the organ donation context, it 
seeks to demonstrate that the reform process failed adequately to address the central issue of 
informed consent. It is argued that this prevented a meaningful reform of the law in this area. 
The paper draws on select aspects of regulatory theory and analogous legal regimes to lend 
support to the views expressed herein, and to offer comment on how the reform process could 
be structured more effectively in the future. In particular, it is argued that increased public 
participation will be a necessary factor in resolving the informed consent issue. Finally, the 
paper briefly considers the Financial Assistance for Live Organ Donors Bill that is currently 
before Parliament. It argues that, while the Bill is meritorious, it is unlikely to have a 
significant impact on donation rates and that a more constructive course of action would be to 
address the issues discussed herein. 
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I Introduction 
New Zealand has, for some time, had one of the lowest rates of organ donation in the Western 
World. In 2013, New Zealand’s rate of donors “per million population” was placed at 8.1. By 
contrast, Australia was placed at 16.9, and Spain, the world leaders in organ donor numbers, at 
35.1.1 
According to Organ Donation New Zealand, the official donor agency:2 
More than 550 New Zealanders are waiting for an organ transplant and approximately 450 
of these are waiting for a kidney transplant. People waiting for a heart, lungs or liver may 
die without a successful transplant while those waiting for a kidney transplant lead lives 
restricted by long-term dialysis treatment… Many more people are waiting for tissue 
transplants, including corneas, heart valves and skin. 
By way of contrast, there were just 46 deceased organ donors in New Zealand in 2014. This 
was the highest number achieved in the previous decade.3    
In 2005, just prior to winning the largest number of seats in that year’s general election, the 
Labour party announced its health policy. As part of that policy, the party made a commitment 
to raising the rate of organ donation in New Zealand.  
Annette King MP, speaking on behalf of the party, stated: 4   
The issue of consent has stimulated considerable debate, and the Organ Donation Register 
[a proposed central register for donors in New Zealand] will ensure that there is an 
effective, informed consent process, so that people who have indicated they want to be 
organ donors have their wishes respected. 
At that stage, the law regarding organ donation was still governed by the Human Tissue Act 
1964, an outdated piece of legislation. A review undertaken by the Ministry of Health in 2004 
had identified substantial shortcomings in the regulation of organ donation, and proposed that 
a new regulatory framework be implemented in the form of a new Human Tissue Act.5 
                                                                                                                                                 
1 Organ Donation New Zealand “International donor rates” (2015) Organ Donation New Zealand website 
<http://www.donor.co.nz>. 
2 Organ Donation New Zealand “Waiting list” (2015) Organ Donation New Zealand website <www.donor.co.nz>.   
3 Organ Donation New Zealand “Number of deceased organ donors in New Zealand” (2015) Organ Donation 
New Zealand website <http://www.donor.co.nz>. 
4 New Zealand Labour Party “Organ Donor Register to be established” (press release, 1 September 2005). 
5 Ministry of Health Review of the Regulation of Human Tissue and Tissue-based Therapies: Discussion document 
(2004) at 100.  
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In 2006, the Human Tissue Bill was introduced into Parliament. Pete Hodgson MP, Minister 
of Health at the time, stated: 6 
The decisions surrounding organ donation are among the most difficult that individuals and 
their families will face. It became clear during the Human Tissue Review that gaps in [the] 
current law were making it difficult for families to work through organ donation decisions. 
The result has often been a default position of not to donate….  
For example, the Current Driver Licensing Register is only an indication of a person's 
wishes, not legal consent for donation. This has often left grieving families unsure about 
what to do… 
It is hoped that the creation of a new Register that provides legal consent and the work of 
Organ Donation New Zealand to improve awareness will lead to an increase of informed 
choices to donate. 
The system for recording one’s wishes on a driver licence was inadequate. In no way could it 
be said to amount to informed consent, yet it was the only readily accessible means of recording 
one’s wishes regarding donation. At the outset, a major focus of the regulatory reform was 
improving that consent process, thereby boosting donation rates.  
However, as the Bill made its way through Parliament, it became clear that overhauling the 
regulatory framework would not be a straightforward process. The Bill faced strenuous 
opposition by the Māori Party, who argued that a system of individual consent regarding the 
disposition of a deceased’s body was inconsistent with tikanga Māori. This opposition captured 
a central tension in the proposed framework: whose wishes ought to be accorded primacy in 
the donation setting? The individual or the family? This tension caused a division of opinion 
during the debate of the Bill.  
The Bill also faced opposition by the intensive care physicians (“intensivists”) who worked at 
the coalface of organ donation. Deceased organ donation in New Zealand can usually only 
proceed when whole brain death has been declared but circulatory function remains. This 
almost exclusively occurs in the intensive care setting.7 The intensivists claimed that the donor 
register would make little practical difference in increasing donation rates. Furthermore, they 
                                                                                                                                                 
6 Human Tissue Bill 2006 (82-1); New Zealand Labour Party “Human Tissue Bill introduced in Parliament” 
(press release, 7 November 2006). 
7 Very occasionally it occurs in the emergency department as well. See: Australian and New Zealand 
Intensive Care Society (ANZICS) The Anzics Statement on Death and Organ Donation (3rd ed, 2008) at 20. 
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made it clear that any system that required the wishes of the individual to be enforced against 
the surviving family was contrary to accepted practice, and would be ignored by them.8 
As a result, the regulatory reform devolved into a process whereby competing considerations 
took hold and pulled in different directions. The minority views of the Māori party clashed 
with those of the National party, who argued that individual consent must take precedence and 
that any informed consent process would be stripped of its efficacy without a central register. 
The Bill was steadily modified in an attempt to strike a balance between these competing 
considerations.  
Consequently, the initial regulatory objective of increasing donation rates by improving the 
consent process was displaced by competing objectives. This created an internally conflicted 
framework that rolled on, unresolved, into the eventual Human Tissue Act 2008, an Act that 
did little more than reinstate the position that existed prior to the reforms.  
This paper provides an overview of the reform and investigates the unique regulatory context 
of organ donation in order to examine the issues that ought to have been explicitly addressed 
and balanced. In addition, it borrows from regulatory theory and comparative fields to 
substantiate the claim that the reform process lost sight of the initial regulatory objective and 
fell short of achieving any meaningful reform. 
Finally, the paper briefly considers the Financial Assistance for Live Organ Donors Bill that is 
currently before Parliament. It will argue that this Bill, while meritorious, is unlikely to have a 
significant impact on donation rates and that a better course of action would be to address the 
issues discussed herein.    
  
                                                                                                                                                 
8 See Part IV below.  
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II Background 
First, it is necessary to set out a brief background to the reform. By looking at past legislation 
and the factors that informed the initial stages of the Human Tissue Bill’s passage through 
Parliament, the initial purpose of the reform can be contrasted with the eventual form of the 
legislation. As will become apparent, the focus of the reforms shifted with increasing input 
from the interested parties involved in organ donation. 
A Donation 
It has been said that one organ donor represents “up to seven lives saved”, given the sum of 
organs potentially available for transplantation.9 
In 2006, over one million New Zealanders had elected to be a donor on their driver licence, yet 
in the previous year only 29 people had become donors after their death.10 One reason for this 
disparity was that the election to be a donor on a New Zealand driver licence had no legal force. 
It might have been indicative of the wishes of the deceased, but it fell well short of the informed 
consent required by the medical profession. As such, it would never be relied upon in practice. 
However, the extent to which the public was aware of this was unclear. Barbara Stewart MP 
stated that:11 
[M]any people believe in recording their wishes through the driver’s licence system, yet 
there is actually no link between Land Transport New Zealand and any health database. 
We must wonder why that process has been followed, when any decision actually made 
and recorded on a driver’s licence cannot be accessed in any way. That process [really] 
does not mean anything at all. 
During the third reading of the Bill, Judy Turner MP put the matter rather more strongly:12 
[The] fact that we have this silly donor provision on our driver’s licence is a complete 
nonsense. When we sign up for a driver’s licence we want a driver’s licence; we are not 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 Specifically, two lungs and kidneys and one heart, liver and pancreas. See: Thomas May, Mark P. Aulisio and 
Michael A. DeVita “Patients, Families, and Organ Donation: Who Should Decide?” (2000) 78(2) Millbank 
Quarterly 323 at 324. For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that pancreas-only transplants generally do 
not proceed in New Zealand because the side-effects from the post-transplant immunosuppressant drugs required 
are considered to outweigh the therapeutic benefits of transplantation. Pancreas transplants are usually performed 
with simultaneous kidney transplants for conditions which result in a non-functioning pancreas, such as Type 1 
Diabetes. See: National Ethics Advisory Committee Ethical Issues Relating to Access to Organ Transplantation: 
NEAC Report to the Associate Minister of Health (20 January 2015) at 3. 
10 (14 November 2006) 635 NZPD 6471.  
11 (14 November 2006) 635 NZPD 6470. 
12 (8 April 2008) 646 NZPD 15439.  
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thinking about donations. When the question is put to us at that point we make a kind of 
snap and fairly thoughtless decision one way or another. It is a bit of a blunt instrument and 
it means nothing. 
Even among donors who did satisfy the informed consent requirements, donation would not 
always proceed. Sue Kedgley MP noted that in 2005, there was a pool of 104 potential donors, 
but the possibility of donation was not even raised with the family in 35 instances.13 
B Human Tissue Act 1964 
Prior to the reforms, the use and collection of human tissue from deceased persons in New 
Zealand was regulated by the Human Tissue Act 1964 (the “1964 Act”). When the 1964 Act 
was drafted, the only available transplants were corneas and heart valves.14 By the 21st 
Century, it was argued that the Act was failing to keep pace with technological developments 
in organ donation medicine.15    
Section 3 of the 1964 Act regulated the removal of human tissue for “therapeutic purposes”.16 
Section 3(1) set out the relevant consent requirement. The wording of the provision is curious. 
If a person had requested that their body or a specified part of their body be donated, the 
person lawfully in possession of the body (“PLIPOB”) could authorise the removal of body 
parts in accordance with the request.17 Such a request could have been made in writing “at 
any time”, but an oral request was only legally enforceable if made in the presence of two 
witnesses “during [the potential donor’s] last illness”.18 The PLIPOB was entitled to rely on 
the deceased’s request unless there was reason to believe that it had subsequently been 
withdrawn. The following persons were deemed to be a PLIPOB for the purposes of the Act:19 
(a) The person for the time being in charge of any hospital care institution within the meaning 
of [the relevant defining Act], in respect of any body lying in that institution: 
                                                                                                                                                 
13 (14 November 2006) 635 NZPD 6471. 
14 Alison Douglass “The new Human Tissue Act” (2008) NZLJ 377 at 377. 
15 Douglass, above n 14, at 377.  
16 Therapeutic purposes was not defined in the Act, but must have included organ donation.  
17 “PLIPOB” is an abbreviation borrowed from Professor PDG Skegg’s “The Removal and Retention of Cadaveric 
Body Parts: Does the Law Require Parental Consent?” (2003) 10(3) OLR 425 at 429.  
18 Section 3(1). 
19 Human Tissue Act 1964, s 2(2)(a)-(c). Out of interest, it should be noted that the provision gave authority to 
the person in charge of a hospital within the meaning of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and 
Treatment) Act 1992 over any body lying in that institution that was the body of a patient. Similarly, s 2(c) gave 
authority to the prison manager over any body lying in the prison that was the body of a prisoner. The person in 
charge of any hospital care institution within the meaning of s 58(4) of the Health and Disability Services (Safety) 
Act 2001 was given authority over “any body lying in that institution”, not only those of patients.  
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(b) The person for the time being in charge of any hospital within the meaning of the Mental 
Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, in respect of any body lying 
in the hospital, being the body of a patient: 
(c) The prison manager of any prison, in respect of any body lying in the prison that is the 
body of a prisoner.   
Section 3(1A) was inserted in 1989 by amendment,20 and provided that the PLIPOB was 
entitled to rely on a written request by the potential donor where that request was held on a 
“health computer system”. This amendment enabled a central register of potential donors to be 
created. At that time it was hoped that this would increase rates of deceased organ donation. 
However, the register did not have the desired effect.21 
In addition, s 3(2) allowed a PLIPOB to authorise the collection of human tissue so long as, 
having made such reasonable enquiry as was practicable in the circumstances, there was no 
reason to believe that the deceased had objected to the collection of their tissue, or that any 
partner or surviving relative of the deceased did not so object.22 Therefore, if the PLIPOB 
wished unilaterally to authorise collection, they had to enquire as to consent. However, that 
enquiry was sensitive to circumstance, such as the difficulty in locating a surviving relative of 
the deceased, or the pressure to utilise viable organs before they deteriorated.  
Section 3(4) provided that no removal of human tissue could be effected “except by a medical 
practitioner”. The provision stated that such a practitioner must be satisfied, by personal 
examination of the body, “that life is extinct”. This was the extent of the 1964 Act’s reference 
to what constituted death for the purposes of organ donation.23   
Several points may be noted here. First, while the PLIPOB (usually, but not always, a medical 
practitioner) was entitled to rely upon the request of the deceased unless there was reason to 
believe the request had been withdrawn, there was no positive obligation on the practitioner to 
make any enquiry as to whether the request had been withdrawn.  
                                                                                                                                                 
20 Human Tissue Amendment Act 1989, s 3. 
21 Susan Watson “Gifts to strangers: organ donation in New Zealand” (2002) NZLJ 291 at 291. 
22 Section 3(2)(a)-(b).  
23 The current Act is no clearer in this regard, see Human Tissue Act 2008, s 50(2): “A qualified person must not 
collect human tissue [unless] the qualified person is satisfied, by personal examination of the body, that the 
individual concerned is dead.” 
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Secondly, if the PLIPOB wished to authorise the collection of organs in accordance with s 3(1) 
of the Act, the wishes of the family were irrelevant. In theory at least, this would have allowed 
a practitioner to collect the organs of an older child against the wishes of the parents.24  
Thirdly, any authorisation given under s 3(2) contained no requirement of consent on the part 
of the surviving family. All that was required of the PLIPOB was that he or she make “such 
reasonable enquiry as [may have been] practicable” and obtain the consent of the coroner if 
necessary.25 It should be noted that in a Code of Practice for Transplantation of Cadaveric 
Organs released by the Department of Health, it was advised that:26 
In most instances it [would] be sufficient to discuss the matter with any one relative who 
[had] been in close contact with the deceased, asking him his own views, the views of the 
deceased and also if he [had] any reason to believe that any other relative would be likely 
to object.   
C Human Tissue Review 
1 Code of health and disability services consumers’ rights 
Between the 1964 Act and the reforms, the medical profession underwent substantial changes 
in respect of patients’ rights. In 1996, the Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers' 
Rights (the “Code”) came into force as a regulation under the Health and Disability 
Commissioner Act 1994.27 The Code set up a series of rights for consumers of Health and 
Disability services, and corresponding obligations imposed on medical professionals providing 
those services. 
This followed the 1988 Cartwright Inquiry,28 and established a patient-centred medical 
approach that shook the profession free from its former paternalistic attitudes.29 It placed 
patient rights at the forefront, with particular emphasis on the right to give informed consent. 
Under Right 7 of the Code every patient has the right “to make an informed choice and give 
informed consent”.30 This right distils the patient’s related rights to be treated with dignity, to 
                                                                                                                                                 
24 See Skegg, above n 17, at 431.  
25 See s 3(5).  
26 Department of Health A Code of Practice for Transplantation of Cadaveric Organs (1987) at 4.3(d). 
27 Health and Disability Commissioner (Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers' Rights) Regulations 
1996, s 1.  
28 Silvia Cartwright The Report of the Cervical Cancer Inquiry (Government Printing Office, 1988).   
29 Ron Paterson “The Cartwright Legacy: shifting the focus of attention from the doctor to the patient” (2010) 123 
NZMJ 6. 
30 Health and Disability Commissioner (Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers' Rights) Regulations 
1996, s 2.  
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be given all relevant information concerning their condition and treatment options and to be 
protected from the vulnerability inherent in the doctor-patient relationship.31 Fundamentally, 
the right to make an informed choice regarding treatment options substantiates the patient’s 
autonomy. 
2 Human tissue review 
In March 2004, the Ministry of Health published a review of the existing regulation of human 
tissue.32 A new Human Tissue Act was proposed from the outset and informed consent was a 
key focus. 
The Ministry stated that “[t]he rights and expectations of the public [had] become more 
sophisticated since legislation such as the Human Tissue Act 1964 was passed.”33 Presumably, 
what the Ministry meant by this was that more sophisticated procedures had become available, 
and that new public expectations had developed in response. The document’s explicit focus 
was on “the regulatory environment” governing the use of human tissue.34 One goal of the 
review was:35  
To develop a new regulatory framework…that appropriately [promoted] the cultural and 
spiritual needs of New Zealanders and the public good associated with the use of human 
tissue for therapeutic and non-therapeutic purposes. 
The Ministry stressed that in practice, organ donation in New Zealand would not proceed 
without the consent of the family. Even at that stage, it was accepted that any refusal by the 
surviving family would override the express wish of the deceased to be a donor. It was noted 
that this was a “contentious” notion for some.36 Apart from being contentious, it was also 
argued to be at odds with the legislative intent.37 
                                                                                                                                                 
31 Ron Paterson, above n 29, at 7.  
32 Ministry of Health Review of the Regulation of Human Tissue and Tissue-based Therapies: Discussion 
document (2004).  
33 Ministry of Health, above n 32, at 1. 
34 Ministry of Health, above n 32, at 1. 
35 Ministry of Health, above n 32, at 1. 
36 Ministry of Health, above n 32, at 64. 
37 See Chen, Palmer and Partners Organ Donation: A comparative legal analysis and options for change in New 
Zealand (2003) Unpublished paper prepared for the Nana Sue Project, Quality Shoe Marketing, Wellington. By 
contrast, s 8(g) of the Coroners Act 1988 required a coroner, in deciding whether or not to authorise a post-mortem 
examination, to have regard to “[t]he desire of any member of the immediate family of the person concerned that 
a post-mortem examination should be performed.” This created a positive obligation on the part of the coroner to 
ascertain the views of the surviving family that, as mentioned above, was not incumbent on a PLIPOB seeking to 
authorise collection of the deceased’s organs under s 3(2) of the Human Tissue Act 1964. It is arguable that 
analogous language could have been introduced into the Human Tissue Act, either at the time of drafting or 
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The Ministry noted a number of problems with the existing law.38 First, despite the 1989 
amendment that allowed for the creation of a centralised donor registry, organ donation rates 
in New Zealand were still very low.  
Secondly, there was no obligation on a medical practitioner to carry out a donor’s request.  
Thirdly, the practice among medical practitioners was always to seek the family’s consent 
before collecting organs, which was said to be contrary to the intent of the legislation.  
Fourthly, it was noted that the driver licence registration system for donors (practically 
speaking, the most common way people would be likely to record their wishes) was not binding 
under the Human Tissue Act.  
The Ministry also referred to the main regulatory issue in saying that “[p]ublic debate about 
the legislation in New Zealand centres on the ability for the family to override the wishes of 
the deceased person...”39 The Ministry framed the essential question as how to resolve two 
competing principles: maximisation of health benefits through increased transplantation (pro-
collection) and according respect to the wishes of the deceased’s family (pro-family/whanau 
consent).40 It was pointed out that if primacy was accorded to the former, any system that 
eroded the need for consent (such as a “presumed consent” model) would gain legitimacy.41        
3 Initial focus: improving consent 
The net result of the Ministry’s consultation was a recommendation that the system be 
improved to uphold the wishes of the individual donor. This would have been consistent with 
the principle of informed consent. However, as will be seen, this objective was not pursued to 
the end. It will be argued below that inherent issues in the way the regulatory reform proceeded 
caused the law to founder before it could properly address the issues it set out to. 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
through the Human Tissue Amendment Act 1989, if Parliament had desired authorisation of the collection of 
organs to be contingent upon the consent of the surviving family.  
38 At 64-65. 
39 At 65. 
40 At 66.  
41 At 65. 
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III Human Tissue Bill 
Consistent with the original direction of the reform, the draft Human Tissue Bill contained the 
following clause:42 
45      Authority to act on appropriate consent 
(1) Appropriate consent (as defined in section 7) given other than under section 33 or 34 
may be acted on with no further authority than this subsection. 
(2) In particular, appropriate consent (as so defined) given by an individual, nominee, 
or nominees, in accordance with section 28(a) or (b), is valid, and may be acted on, 
even if it is disagreed with by the responsible person, or all or any members of that 
individual’s immediate family, or both. 
(3) Appropriate consent (as so defined) given under section 33 or 34 may be acted on 
with no further authority than this subsection only if the following requirements (if 
applicable) have been satisfied: 
(a) the requirement to comply with section 46 before acting on consent given under 
section 33 on behalf of the immediate family: 
(b) the requirement to comply with section 47 before acting on consent given under 
section 34 by a senior available next of kin. 
It is clear, and it was accepted by the Health Committee, that this clause gave primacy to the 
wishes of the deceased donor.43  
A First Reading 
During the Bill’s first reading, Ruth Dyson MP referred to the issues raised by the Ministry of 
Health’s review, noting that the Bill aimed to:44 
[A]ddress concerns raised during public consultation, including a lack of clarity around the 
informed consent requirements for the collection and retention of tissue; the role of family 
members in giving consent for the collection and use of tissue from a person who has died, 
and the lack of individual autonomy in the area; a lack of clarity in relation to the donor 
status on the national register of drivers’ licences – many people think the register records 
consent, when it records only an indication of wishes – and New Zealand’s organ donation 
rates, which are low compared with other OECD countries. 
                                                                                                                                                 
42 Human Tissue Bill 2006 (82-2).  
43 Human Tissue Bill 2006 (82-2) (select committee report) at 3. 
44 (14 November 2006) 635 NZPD 6467.  
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Ms Dyson further commented that the objectives of the Bill were to:45 
Ensure that the autonomy and dignity of the individual from whom tissue is collected is 
recognised and respected, and that the cultural and spiritual needs of New Zealanders are 
recognised and respected. Further objectives are to ensure there is clarity for clinicians and 
the public around the consent process, clear mechanisms for the use and management of 
human tissue for non-therapeutic purposes, and consistency with regulations in other 
related areas. 
Ms Dyson noted that informed consent was “the fundamental principle underpinning the lawful 
collection and use of human tissue from deceased people.”46 Ms Dyson further commented that 
there was “considerable support from a broad range of people” for the wishes of the deceased 
to take primacy, and that the “existence of appropriate consent would be sufficient for 
[donation] to be lawful.”47  However, she also stated that “in practice, there may be a number 
of reasons why [donation] should not proceed.”48 For example, the bereaved may be 
“distressed” by the decision to collect the organs of the deceased. This indicates that even at 
the early stage of the Bill, there was a rift between the formal legal possibility of the legislation 
and how it might be applied in practice.  
Interestingly, it was noted that the Bill made provision for situations where, owing to existence 
of appropriate safeguards, the requirement for informed consent could be dispensed with in the 
public interest. Research approved by an ethics committee was cited as an example.49 
Reference was also made to tissue collected by the coroner, and for “criminal justice 
purposes”.50 
The final point raised by Ms Dyson was that the Bill aimed to strike “a balance between respect 
for the wishes of the deceased person and the cultural and spiritual needs of his or her family”.51  
B Select Committee 
Both the National Party and the Māori Party expressed contrasting minority views at the Select 
Committee stage. The Māori Party had tabled amendments that allowed the surviving family 
to submit an overriding objection that would prohibit the collection or use of organs from a 
                                                                                                                                                 
45 At 6467. 
46 At 6468.  
47 At 6468.  
48 At 6468 (emphasis added). 
49 At 6468. 
50 At 6468.  
51 At 6469. 
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consenting donor.52 These amendments were rejected by the Health Committee and defeated 
when later tabled as a Supplementary Order Paper.53  
The National Party had expressed the view that they “fully [supported] the fundamental 
premise of the bill that the informed consent of the individual has primacy”.54 The Party 
further supported the inclusion of a national register, expressing their concern that without a 
means to record the informed consent of prospective donors, the effect of any public campaign 
to increase donor rates would be “diluted”.55 
However, the Committee stated that they “[understood] the difficulty of enforcing the wishes 
of the deceased individual if those wishes conflict with the wishes of the individual’s family.”56 
Accordingly, they recommended that the Bill provide for the authority not to act on informed 
consent. The Committee reported:57 
The proposed consent framework in the bill gives primacy to any informed consent given 
or objection raised by the individual whose tissue might be collected or used. However, we 
understand the difficulty of enforcing the wishes of the deceased individual if those wishes 
conflict with the wishes of the individual’s family. Most of us consider it necessary that 
anyone proposing to collect or use human tissue, such as organ donation co-ordinators or 
transplant surgeons, be able to decide not to proceed with collection or use of tissue where 
families strongly oppose it. We consider that the bill should provide informed consent 
requirements that must be met before tissue collection or use [proceeds]; it should not 
require that collection or use must happen if these informed consent requirements are met. 
We therefore recommend making it explicit that nothing in the bill requires that—  
• collection or use of human tissue proceed  
• informed consent for the collection or use of tissue be acted on. 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
52 In submission to the Health Committee, later formalised in Supplementary Order Paper 2007 (156) Human 
Tissue Bill 2006 (82-1) (proposed amendments) at 1.  
53 (13 November 2007) 643 NZPD at 13059. 
54 Human Tissue Bill 2006 (82-2) (select committee report) at 8.  
55 At 8.  
56 At 3.  
57 At 3.  
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When the Bill was reported by the Committee, Clause 45, mentioned above, had been deleted 
by unanimous agreement, and the following clause inserted in its place:  
10C Person justified in deciding not to collect or use tissue 
A person who proposes to collect or use human tissue is justified in deciding not to do so 
if satisfied, based on all information available to the person in the circumstances, that any 
informed consent for the collection or use of that tissue should for any reason not be acted 
on. 
This clause found its way unaltered into the eventual Act.58  
C In Committee / Third Reading 
By the time the Bill was debated, issues began to arise regarding the scope and thoroughness 
of the reform. Jonathan Coleman MP foreshadowed the Bill’s limitations when he stated:59  
[A]t the end of the day, I do not think we will get anywhere fast or come to any substantial 
destination on this whole issue of human tissue donation, and on the rights of people to 
determine what happens to their tissue, unless we hold that concept of the primacy of 
informed consent at the very heart of the debate.  
To Dr Coleman, this underpinned the National Party’s minority stance. He was concerned that 
the technical debate surrounding the Bill risked losing sight of that core principle. 
Judy Turner MP, speaking on behalf of United Future, stated:60 
[T]he obvious point, or crux of the matter, is the hearts and minds of family members at 
what is a very traumatic time in that family’s life. They are the people who decide, and 
even if they know that their family member was keen to be a donor, the pressures and 
emotional turmoil they are facing at that time can cloud the issue. This is a stone that I 
believe has not been fully turned over and explored yet.  
One option proposed by Ms Turner was to have blood donation staff undertake the organ 
donation conversation with potential donors. Apart from hypotheticals, Ms Turner’s driving 
point was that she believed “[The Government] had not thoroughly examined every 
opportunity” at the time of the Bill’s third reading.  
                                                                                                                                                 
58 Human Tissue Act 2008, s 17. 
59 (13 November 2007) 643 NZPD 13053.  
60 (8 April 2008) 646 NZPD 15439.  
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However, Lesley Soper MP commented on her experience at the Select Committee stage, 
stating that the Health Committee had “heard during the hearing of submissions many, many 
heartfelt submissions for and against individual or family decisions on these matters.”61 She 
considered the Bill to strike “a good balance” in that respect.62  
The legislation arguably did not strike a balance at all. By providing legislative sanction for the 
decision not to proceed, the status quo of requiring the family’s consent was reinforced, which 
in fact undercut the informed consent principle.  
Nevertheless, the view that the Bill represented a balance of the difficult competing positions 
prevailed and the resulting Act was in accordance with the recommendations of the Health 
Committee. 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
61 At 13055.  
62 At 13055. 
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IV Regulatory Context 
In this section, the unique context of deceased organ donation will be explored. In particular, 
it will be argued that as a regulatory system, it suffered from myriad conflicts that created 
significant complications.  
By highlighting the factors peculiar to organ donation, it will argue that the reform process 
failed adequately to hold the essential question of informed consent in its sights, and that this 
caused the process to break down.  
Following this, aspects of regulatory theory will be employed to illustrate the importance of 
clearly defining the regulatory “targets”, discussed below. The regulatory context of organ 
donation involves a variety of “instruments”. It will be argued that the failure adequately to 
frame the regulatory targets blocked any discussion of whether one instrument ought to have 
been emphasised over another.   
This situation will be contrasted with a brief overview of the theory of “smart regulation” to 
demonstrate how viewing the reforms through a regulatory lens confirms that the reform 
process stalled before it could arrive at a meaningful conclusion on the relevant issues.   
A Regulatory Targets 
The Human Tissue Act 2008 was intended to provide a comprehensive framework regulating 
the collection and use of human tissue from deceased persons in New Zealand.63 
Given its aims, the regulatory system has certain distinct but related regulatory “targets”. On 
the one hand, the regulatory target is the policy initiative that the law seeks to secure. This can 
otherwise be understood as the regulatory “objective”. On the other hand, the regulatory target 
is the actor whose behaviour is regulated. This can otherwise be understood as the “subject” of 
the regulation. Both give rise to issues in this context.  
1 Regulatory objectives 
As mentioned above, the impetus for change can be traced back to the Labour party’s election 
promise to establish an organ donor register and boost organ donation rates.64 As such, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
63 It was not intended to cover reproductive tissue or cells, which are instead governed by the Human Assisted 
Reproductive Technology Act 2004. 
64 And to the credit of Andy Tookey, who lodged a petition with the Government to review the organ donation 
laws that prompted an earlier Ministry of Health review. See: Petition 2002/25 of Andy Tookey and 1,169 others 
(26 November 2003) (as reported by the Health Committee).  
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regulatory objective could fairly be framed as raising organ donation rates. Indeed, during the 
debate of the Bill, frequent references were made to New Zealand’s poor rate of donation and 
the pressing need to improve it. Indeed, Jonathan Coleman MP argued that the “real impetus” 
for the Human Tissue Bill was addressing this issue.65  
A further objective closely related to raising the donation rate is the need to realise the 
therapeutic potential of available organs. Given the organ shortage, if circumstances allow for 
collection, the regulatory system must enable available organs to be collected.  
The debate surrounding the passage of the Bill also made it clear that another regulatory 
objective existed in the need to ensure that the cultural and spiritual needs of the immediate 
family of the deceased were respected. 
A fourth regulatory objective also existed by virtue of the central role of informed consent in 
the legislation. By placing consent at the centre of the regulatory framework, the principle of 
autonomy is accordingly upheld. If it is accepted that the ability to exert control over one’s 
body is an expression of autonomy, an appropriate objective of such a framework should be to 
give proper recognition to the wishes of the deceased. 
These regulatory objectives found legislative expression in the purpose provision of the Human 
Tissue Act:66 
3  Purpose of this Act 
 The purpose of this Act is to help to ensure that collection or use of human tissue- 
(a) occurs only with proper recognition of, and respect for, -- 
(i) the autonomy and dignity of the individual whose tissue is, before or 
after his or her death, collected or used; and 
(ii) the cultural and spiritual needs, values, and beliefs of the immediate 
family of that individual; and 
(iii) the cultural, ethical, and spiritual implications of the collection or use 
of human tissue; and 
(iv) the public good associated with collection or use of human tissue 
(whether for health practitioner education, the investigation of 
offences, research, transplantation or other therapeutic purposes, or for 
other lawful purposes); and 
(b) does not endanger the health and safety of members of the public; and 
                                                                                                                                                 
65 (13 November 2007) 643 NZPD 13054.  
66 Human Tissue Act 2008, s 3.  
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(c) generally does not involve the requirement or acceptance, or the offering or 
provision, of financial or other consideration for the tissue.  
2 Regulated subjects 
First, the Act provides that only a “qualified person” may collect tissue.67 This is obviously 
intended to restrict collection to medical professionals and trainees.68 Contravention of the 
consent requirements by any medical professional will be met with penalties, provided by the 
Act.69 By providing a system of rules and sanctions governing the behaviour of the medical 
professionals involved in the organ donation context, those medical professionals are regulated 
subjects.70  
Secondly, by spelling out the requirements for informed consent and by providing a legislative 
hierarchy for who is entitled to give informed consent or raise an objection on behalf of the 
deceased,71 the legislation also regulates the prospective donors and their surviving family by 
defining their rights.  
Thirdly, the legislation also has the effect of regulating the supply of deceased organs in New 
Zealand. Therefore, the potential pool of recipients on the waiting list for those organs are also 
regulated subjects. 
B Conflict of Interests 
One issue with the regulatory framework is that the regulatory objectives mentioned above 
conflict. A related issue is that the interests held by the various participants in the regulatory 
system also conflict.  
Upholding the autonomy of the individual and according due respect to the cultural and 
spiritual needs of the family are, in some instances, squarely at odds with one another. The 
most obvious case of this is where the wishes of the deceased are contrary to the cultural and 
spiritual beliefs of the surviving family, who may not agree with organ donation.  
                                                                                                                                                 
67 Section 50.  
68 See the criteria in s 50(3).  
69 Section 22.  
70 The normal procedure in situations of proposed organ donation is for the intensivists caring for the patient to 
consult a donor coordinator to discuss the option of donation prior to broaching the topic with the surviving family. 
The donor coordinator will stand by, ready to liaise with the organ removal team and associated support staff 
should it be decided that collection is to proceed. See: Australian and New Zealand Intensive Care Society 
(ANZICS) The Anzics Statement on Death and Organ Donation (3rd ed, 2008) at 24.  
71 See Human Tissue Act 2008, Subparts 1 and 3.  
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However, it is also the case when an individual has consented to donation, but out of sensitivity 
to the family’s grief, the conversation is avoided.  
When such deadlock situations are possible, the regulatory reform should weigh the competing 
interests and reach a principled decision on which will have primacy. It will be argued that this 
did not occur in the reform process, and as a result, the wishes of the family were given default 
primacy without any principled justification.  
Respecting the cultural and spiritual needs of the family also has the potential to conflict with 
the objectives of raising organ donation rates and realising the therapeutic potential of available 
organs. Under the current system, the donation conversation takes place in the context of end-
of-life care. It is a time when the surviving family are forced to cope with the death of a loved 
one, and are potentially experiencing significant emotional distress.  
An objective of raising donation rates will dictate that collection of the deceased’s organs must 
be pursued, whereas an objective of respecting the needs of the family will dictate that they 
should be given space to deal with their bereavement. The organ donation conversation is a 
rational one, but it occurs at a time when people are not necessarily thinking rationally. 
Similarly, the interests of the surviving family also conflict with the interest of patients on the 
waiting list who stand to benefit from organ donation. Any decision that foregoes collection 
out of respect for the surviving family deprives the waiting list patients of a life-saving 
procedure. This was not ignored in the debate of the Bill. For example, Jo Goodhew MP stated 
that “[New Zealanders] whose future health may depend on aspects of this legislation are also 
stakeholders.”72 However, it will be argued that, ultimately, the significance of this point was 
not properly addressed in the reform process.  
C Conflict of Roles 
One of the most problematic conflicts in the current system of organ donation lies with the role 
of the intensivists.  
During the second reading of the Human Tissue Bill, Judy Turner MP reported on her 
experience on the Health Committee. She spoke of the submissions received by the Committee 
as far back as 2002 from intensivists and relayed their submission that: 73 
                                                                                                                                                 
72 (23 October 2007) 643 NZPD 12625.  
73 (23 October 2007) 643 NZPD 12619.  
22 
 
[The Government] could regulate as much as [it] wanted regarding having a register, and 
making it mandatory, and closing the door for families to object once somebody had made 
up his or her mind - [The Government] could pass any law [it] liked – but they, as caring 
health professionals working with families and loved ones, were [never] going to insist that 
organs were harvested from a body against the wishes of a family.  
During the first reading of the Human Tissue Bill, Jackie Blue MP commented on the 
submissions received on her own member’s bill, the Human Tissue (Organ Donation) 
Amendment Bill. The Bill sought primarily to establish a nationwide register for organ donors. 
Dr Blue noted:74 
Interestingly, the main objections to a voluntary opt-on register [were] from intensive care 
doctors and some transplant surgeons, who [felt] that a register would be overly 
bureaucratic and expensive, and that it would not increase the number of donors. The 
doctors also [considered] that families, when asked about donation, do not object in the 
vast majority of situations, and do not support the donor’s wishes being paramount. 
As will be discussed below, the intensivists consider support of the family to be inextricable 
from end-of-life care. As such, “closing the door” on the family is seen as contrary to their 
whole professional approach.  
D Māori Cultural Objection 
Any system of regulation that seeks to secure legitimacy must reflect the wider cultural beliefs 
of New Zealanders, and take account of tikanga Māori.75 In this context, cultural beliefs have 
been defined as “those beliefs relevant to organ donation that derive from the broader culture 
inherent in one’s ethnic group membership”.76  
During the first reading of the Human Tissue Bill 2006, Tariana Turia MP stressed that there 
was an important distinction between living and deceased organ donation as far as Māori were 
concerned. Fundamental Māori views concerning the “circle of life” required that all bodies be 
returned to the earth intact.77 According to Ms Turia, the legislation governing deceased organ 
donation was fundamentally flawed vis-à-vis Māori because the “sacred value of whakapapa” 
precluded acceptance of the basic premise that organ donation between the dead and the living 
                                                                                                                                                 
74 (14 November 2006) 635 NZPD 6469 (emphasis added). 
75 Law Commission The Legal Framework for Burial and Cremation in New Zealand: A First Principles Review 
(October 2013) at 16.4. 
76 Carmen M. Radecki and James Jaccard “Psychological Aspects of Organ Donation: A Critical Review and 
Synthesis of Individual and Next-of-Kin Donation Decisions.” (1997) 16(2) Health Psychology 183 at 184.  
77 (14 November 2006) 635 NZPD 6473.  
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was appropriate. As such, she said the Bill “would not even get to first base” in addressing the 
“cultural, spiritual, and ethical implications of the collection and use of human tissue”.78  
In commenting on the proposal that an individual’s wishes be able to override the wishes of 
the surviving family, Ms Turia said:79 
That does not sit well with [the Māori Party]. No individual stands alone. Our kaupapa, our 
tikanga as tangata whenua, describe an individual person or body not as merely his or her 
own but as a connected and vibrant manifestation of whakapapa, the ancestral line. The 
link, the chain of whakapapa, is therefore of significance to the whanau as a whole, and 
decisions to sever such a link have implications for the well-being of the whanau, past, 
present, and future.  
During the debate of the Bill, Te Ururoa Flavell referred to the Māori perspective vis-à-vis the 
legislation as a “clash of ideology – or philosophy, if you like – in respect of how we view 
death, how we view body parts and so on.”80 Mr Flavell referred to the Supplementary Order 
Paper that the Māori Party had tabled allowing the family a statutory right of veto over the 
wishes of the deceased, and made the following remarks:81 
Although the Māori Party holds the expectation that all legislation should recognise tikanga 
Māori, as was anticipated in the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, this is especially so with 
any legislation concerning whakapapa material. I suppose it is an entirely reasonable 
expectation that in Aotearoa New Zealand any laws concerning human remains could 
acknowledge the world view of tangata whenua, thereby giving recognition to the rights of 
the collective alongside Western World views that give precedence to the rights of the 
individual. The purpose of our Supplementary Order Paper is to open the bill’s consent 
framework to both world views and create a truly bicultural law. Given the presence of 
both our nation’s and other culture’s world views that esteem the collective, there is also 
the opportunity to create a multicultural law.  
However, Ms Turia also noted that there could reasonably be a divergence of views on the 
issue within discrete Māori communities. She accepted that:82 
                                                                                                                                                 
78 At 6473. 
79 At 6474. 
80 (13 November 2007) 643 NZPD 13057. 
81 At 13058.  
82 At 6474.  
24 
 
 [It was] not inconceivable that [a whanau or hapu] may well weigh up all the determining 
factors and conclude they may indeed derive some benefit from the donation of human 
tissue and, as such, it should be up to them to decide.  
Indeed, Steve Chadwick MP confirmed this when she spoke about her involvement with the 
Ministry of Health during its consultation period as part of the Human Tissue Review. While 
corroborating the view that Ms Turia expressed, Ms Chadwick said “but, oddly, there is always 
another side.”83 She reported meeting with a number of families whose sentiments she 
paraphrased as follows:84 
If we are involved primarily with our general practitioner and our primary health 
organisation, and we understand how they take our organs when we are declared brain-
dead, what those organs are used for, and that procedure, kei te pai, we do not feel quite so 
frightened about this.  
The issue is also complicated significantly for Māori by the fact that the Māori population is 
overrepresented in dialysis statistics.85 Mr Flavell highlighted the internal tension this has the 
potential to create when he stated:86  
Until one is in [the donation situation], one will never really understand how important [the 
issues] are… I noted that not a lot of Māori were on the register, and it would be fair to say, 
of course, that many Māori would be the ones…screaming out for some of the organs…we 
are talking about. 
This broad ideological objection to the organ donation legislation is addressed further below.  
E Donor Register Question 
The question of whether a central donor register ought to be set up consumed a lot of the debate 
around both the Human Tissue Bill and the Human Tissue (Organ Donation) Amendment Bill. 
The register was a central feature of the latter Bill. 
It should be recalled that an attempt at a donor register had already been attempted by an 
amendment to the Human Tissue Act 1964.87 In a 1991 review of that register, the Department 
                                                                                                                                                 
83 At 6475. 
84 At 6475. 
85 Bridget Faire and Ian Dittmer “Improving equity of access to deceased donor kidneys in New Zealand” (2008) 
18(1) Progress in Transplantation 10 at 10.  
86 (13 November 2007) 643 NZPD 13057. 
87 See the discussion of the Human Tissue Act 1964 in Part II above. 
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of Health noted that the most frequently cited issues that medical staff faced in retrieving organs 
were:88 
[A] lack of intensive care resources, a lack of national coordination, patients not being put 
on ventilators, difficulties in asking for consent, lack of awareness of donation by 
provincial hospital staff, and public confusion over the concept of brain death.   
The report of the Select Committee stated that the evidence did not indicate that a register would 
have a meaningful impact on organ donation rates.89 The Committee considered the two bills 
contemporaneously and considered the “consent framework for the collection and use of human 
tissue” proposed by the Human Tissue Bill to be adequate. Essentially, the Committee 
considered the creation of a register to be “unnecessary”.90 
However, an option was retained in the legislation allowing for the Governor-General, by Order 
in Council, to make regulations establishing a central register at a later date, should it become 
desirable to do so.91  
This accorded with the submissions of the intensivists on the Bills, and it is submitted that this 
is correct. However, it is argued that the reason a central register would not have had a 
meaningful impact on donation rates is that the conflicts inherent in the organ donation context 
present a more significant obstacle than the ability easily to record one’s wishes regarding 
donation.  
Without first addressing the substantial issues inherent in the regulatory system, it is unlikely 
that the creation of a centralised register would have had any meaningful impact. The weight 
of discussion during the passage of the Bill focussed on whether there was sufficient evidence 
to warrant creation of a register, rather than on whether there were more systemic problems 
that precluded its effectiveness that ought to have been addressed. In this sense, it is argued 
that the donor register issue was something of a distraction from the real issues standing in the 
way of New Zealand’s donor shortage problem.  
  
                                                                                                                                                 
88 Department of Health Donating Organs in New Zealand: A review of the National Register (1991).  
89 Human Tissue (Organ Donation) Amendment Bill 2006 (33-1) (select committee report) at 2. 
90 At 2.  
91 Human Tissue Act 2008, s 78.  
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V Guidance from Regulatory Theory 
A Regulatory instruments 
Morgan and Yeung have attempted to classify regulatory instruments according to their 
underlying modality, but stressed that such classifications are not “watertight”. However, what 
they do offer is a “vantage point from which to begin [the] exploration of the mechanics of 
regulatory control”.92 The utility of this vantage point is that it in turn allows questions of the 
validity of a particular choice of regulatory instrument to be raised.93 
The following section provides a brief description of regulatory instruments and their 
application to the organ donation context. In doing so, it seeks to demonstrate that the 
regulatory framework draws on a number of instruments, each of which gives rise to possible 
issues.  
1 Command 
Command as an instrument of regulation can be understood as the “State promulgation of legal 
rules prohibiting specified conduct, underpinned by coercive sanctions [if] the prohibition is 
violated”.94 This is known as “imperium”. However, Daintith has argued that the concept of 
command is wider than simply rule-based coercion, and can encompass the “employment of 
the wealth of government” in pursuit of policy objectives.95 This is known as “dominium”. The 
legal rules surrounding consent in the Human Tissue Act are a basic form of imperium. The 
proposed Financial Assistance for Live Donors Bill, discussed below, is a basic form of 
dominium.   
The medical professionals in the organ donation context will always necessarily be a conduit 
through which the Act is applied in practice. Therefore, the coercive sanctions aimed at medical 
professionals in the Act serve not only to guide their behaviour, but also whether or not the 
wishes of the surviving family or the deceased will be carried out. In this way, the legal rules 
governing consent, and thereby regulating donors and the surviving family, are given legal 
force. 
                                                                                                                                                 
92 Bronwan Morgan and Karen Yeung An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Text and Materials (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2007) at 79. 
93 Morgan and Yeung, above n 92, at 79. 
94 Morgan and Yeung, above n 92, at 81.  
95 T Daintith “The techniques of government” in Morgan and Yeung (eds), above n 92, at 81. 
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Daintith has argued that the notion of experimentation in deploying policies of either imperium 
or dominium responds to the problem of uncertainty:96  
To operate efficient policies which seek to change people’s behaviour, government needs 
adequate information about how they should behave – that is, what standard or target it 
should set; secondly, about how they are behaving now, and why; and thirdly, about what 
sanctions or incentives will align their behaviour with the desired standard or target. None 
of this is information is easy to come by, but getting any of these answers wrong is liable 
to vitiate the policy. 
Daintith further argued that information requirements are useful in explaining government 
choices regarding which regulatory instruments to employ in pursuit of policy objectives.97 
Therefore, not only does information inform the particular choice of regulatory instrument, but 
logically it should inform the way in which that instrument is deployed, i.e. the precise form of 
any legal rule or incentive.  
2 Consensus 
Consensus-based instruments rely upon co-operation as the operative means of regulating 
behaviour. The distinguishing characteristic of this class of regulatory instrument, then, is that 
the underlying modality is the consent of its participants.98 
The usual form of consensus-based regulation is self-regulation, a concept that carries a great 
deal of baggage in the literature. Morgan and Yeung describe the self-regulatory arrangements 
as “informal in nature, deriving their force from social norms and consensus, rather than from 
legally enforceable agreement.”99  
The sanctioning response in situations of self-regulation is a threat of social disapproval and 
ostracism, rather than a legally coercive sanction. Therefore, the role of the law in such a 
situation would be to intervene if the threat of social disapproval or ostracism were to prove 
inadequate in protecting the public from harm.100  
Intensivists can be conceived as partly self-regulated. The oft-cited fear of intensivists that they 
would be “perceived as ghouls” for collecting organs against the wishes of the surviving family 
reflects the threat of social disapproval and ostracism mentioned above and delivers the 
                                                                                                                                                 
96 T Daintith in Morgan and Yeung (eds), above n 92, at 85.  
97 At 85.  
98 Morgan and Yeung, above n 92, at 92.  
99 At 95.  
100 At 96.  
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coercive force that shapes the behaviour of intensivists in the real world, far and above the 
specific legal rule.101 The passages from intensivists quoted above are demonstrative in this 
regard.  
Therefore, whatever the parameters of the law surrounding the collection of organs from 
deceased persons, any system of regulation cannot ignore this self-regulatory aspect governing 
the behaviour of the intensivists and the consequent practice of organ collection. 
3 Communication 
Communication-based tools of regulation also depend upon consensus. Under a 
communication-based model, enhancing the information available to the public seeks to exert 
indirect influence that will cause people to change their behaviour in a way that helps to secure 
the regulatory objective.102 This system of regulation is largely absent in the New Zealand 
context. However, if implemented it would fall largely to Organ Donation New Zealand, who 
is “adamant that its role is about education and raising the community’s awareness.”103  
Under this approach, a public education campaign would be required to bring attention to the 
donor shortage, and also to the fact that the family has the last say on the matter. By enhancing 
the information surrounding donation processes, it would be hoped that prospective donors 
would formally document their intention to be a deceased donor, but also to communicate this 
desire to their families, and ensure that the family will agree to uphold the donor’s wishes in 
the event of their death. 
There are a number of issues with this approach. First, it places an onerous requirement on the 
prospective donor to ensure their wishes have the best chance of being upheld. Expecting all 
donors to go to such lengths to express their wishes seems unrealistic. Furthermore, it has been 
argued that:104  
[Measures that seek to] exhort the public to act in pro-social ways that are consistent with 
government policy objectives [rest on the] rather optimistic [assumption] that individuals 
are receptive to, learn from and act upon, the information communicated.  
                                                                                                                                                 
101 See, for example, Eike-Henner Kluge “Decisions about organ donation should rest with potential donors, not 
next of kin” (1997) 157(2) Can Med Assoc J 160 at 161. 
102 Morgan and Yeung, above n 92, at 96.  
103 (8 April 2008) 646 NZPD 15443, per Steve Chadwick MP.  
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92, at 99. 
29 
 
Secondly, even if a donor could secure their family’s agreement to consent to donation in the 
hypothetical, the situation is altogether different at a time when the family is highly distressed 
at the loss of a loved one.  
Therefore, whatever the measures put in place by the donor, there remains no way for him or 
her to be sure that those wishes will be carried out. To highlight the significance of this final 
point, attention must be drawn again to the fact that donated organs equal lives saved, and the 
decision to donate might be one of the last significant decisions that an individual is able to 
make during his or her life.  
The notion that the deceased’s body can proceed to do good after death might be underscored 
by powerful and genuinely held altruistic and normative beliefs.105 However, no matter how 
strongly the prospective donor feels on the matter, those wishes must be submitted to the 
uncertainties of a potentially distraught surviving family and a highly cautious team of medical 
staff. 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
105 Radecki and Jaccard, above n 76, at 185.  
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VI Burial Law 
A Law Commission Review 
In October 2013, the Law Commission released an Issues Paper that sought to investigate burial 
and cremation law in New Zealand.106 A particular focus of the Law Commission’s work was 
investigating how New Zealanders approached death and the dealings with human remains.  
The Commission noted that burial and cremation regulation was a field that many people would 
be unfamiliar with until they were forced to confront it.107 The same could be said for organ 
donation. Therefore, any attitudes that the Law Commission was able to glean regarding how 
New Zealanders approach the issue of death and, particularly, the wishes of the deceased are 
likely to be of value in the discussion of organ donation legislation. 
In Part Four of the Law Commission’s review, they addressed decision-making and 
disagreement regarding posthumous arrangements. While the Law Commission noted that the 
instinct of most people tasked with making such arrangements was to “do the right thing” by 
the deceased, precisely what that entailed was shaped by those persons’ particular beliefs.108 
For some, the wishes of the deceased gave rise to a moral duty on the part of the bereaved to 
see to those wishes being effected, even when they conflicted with the beliefs of the person 
responsible for making the arrangements. For others, death was said to “[engage] much wider 
family and community interests and obligations than simply enacting the wishes of the 
deceased … [the] dead must accommodate the needs of the living”.109  
The Commission narrowed the issue down to the question: whatever the decision-making 
model adopted, ought the view of the deceased to be given more legal force? The tension 
created by this question was well encapsulated by the Commission when they stated:110 
[A]s individuals we may feel we have a strong interest in being able to direct what happens 
to our bodies after death, but as members of bereaved families we may see merit in a more 
nuanced and collective approach to such decision making. 
The default position in the context of burial disputes in New Zealand is that the executor of the 
deceased’s estate has the right to determine the final arrangements. This common law “executor 
                                                                                                                                                 
106 Law Commission, above n 75. This was the second Issues Paper in the Commission’s review.  
107 At 5.  
108 At 1.53.  
109 At 16. 
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rule” was affirmed by a majority of the New Zealand Supreme Court in Takamore v Clarke.111 
The executor is required to take into account the “customary, cultural and religious practices” 
of the deceased and their family, but there is no obligation of consultation.112 The Law 
Commission noted that the executor rule is inconsistent with the tenets of tikanga Māori, which 
see arrangements concerning the deceased’s body as a community matter that requires robust 
discussion in a collective forum.113  
An important element of the executor rule that the Law Commission highlighted is that the 
executor, in making the final decisions regarding arrangements, was required to take into 
consideration the wishes of the deceased, but was not legally bound to carry them out.114 This 
had been the case since the executor rule was established by the 1882 English decision of 
Williams v Williams.115  
By contrast with the executor rule, the United States generally gives paramountcy to the wishes 
of the deceased, pursuant to a common law right of the deceased to have his or her testamentary 
wishes govern disposition of the body.116  
The Commission noted that the deceased’s wishes do not have legally binding effect in New 
Zealand, and made a convincing case for statutory reform of New Zealand’s burial and 
cremation laws.117 In doing so, they distilled the central issue in these matters down to a 
relatively simple question: should the individual have control over the manner in which his or 
her body is treated following death? The Commission set out the arguments for and against 
such a proposition, which are of general relevance to the present organ donation discussion. 
1 For paramountcy of deceased’s wishes 
The case for individual paramountcy is that the right to control what becomes of one’s own 
body is an expression of the individual’s autonomy, a right widely recognised among the living 
in New Zealand’s legal system.118 It was argued that this was a modern attitude on death and 
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dying that moved away from the traditional family focus. Interestingly, its application to burial 
law was said to have derived from principles surrounding donation of one’s body.119  
Upholding the autonomy of the individual required giving effect to his or her expressed wishes 
regarding disposition of their body. The ability to make autonomous posthumous choices 
regarding organ donation was said to lend weight to the notion that burial choices should 
likewise be honoured.120 As we have seen, this is not the case for organ donation in New 
Zealand.121 However, the conceptual link drawn between organ donation wishes and burial and 
cremation choices confirms that fundamental issues of autonomy and interest underlie both 
contexts. 
A link was also drawn to succession law. The Law Commission cited Daniel Sperling, who 
argued in Posthumous Interests: Legal and Ethical Perspectives:122 
If by enforcing a will what we care deeply about is respecting the decedent’s wishes and 
autonomy, then it is not clear why this principle should be defeated in situations where the 
decedent’s wishes are concerned with the disposal of her own body. On the contrary, it 
seems unambiguous that a person’s body is one of the most precious things about which 
she cares, certainly more than her real property. 
It was also noted that upholding the autonomy of the individual might be considered very 
important where the individual’s religious or cultural beliefs conflict with those of their 
family.123  
The Law Commission also noted the discussion in Takamore that the European Convention on 
Human Rights protected the right to respect for private and family life and the right to freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion, which might lend some protection to the particular beliefs 
of the deceased.124 
Finally, the Law Commission pointed out that for some people, autonomy ought to end at death, 
and those people will be fine with delegating the decision surrounding arrangements to their 
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surviving family. This might well be the case in some instances. However, a positive decision 
to express one’s wishes surrounding burial arrangements, or organ donation, would offer 
compelling evidence that that individual did not feel that way.  
2 For paramountcy of bereaved’s wishes  
The interests that the surviving family have in determining the arrangements regarding the 
deceased were said to address the grief that the family experiences, provide closure, and help 
the bereaved readjust following their loss.125 These arguably relate more intuitively to funereal 
or burial arrangements, which are per se a means for addressing the loss of the deceased. 
Therefore, it is unclear how applicable the points raised by the Law Commission are in the 
context of organ donation.  
However, one point raised in the review which is of persuasive value was that family members 
who were compelled to uphold burial arrangements with which they were opposed might feel 
“inhibited in their grief” and have difficulty in finding closure.126 Intuitively, this situation 
would also apply in the context of organ donation. It is certainly arguable that upholding the 
wishes of a donor against the wishes of the surviving family would negatively impact or 
exacerbate the grief the family is already experiencing at their loss. 
3 Statutory reform: the right to decide? 
The Law Commission considered whether the appropriate course was to adopt a statutory right 
of decision that would amount to an enforceable legal interest.127  
In a passage that can be analogised with the organ donation context, the Law Commission 
suggested that, given current practice, a statutory right of decision might be artificial. It was 
pointed out that, more often than not, families reached decisions regarding burial arrangements 
among themselves with little reference to the executor.128 However, they did argue that, insofar 
as practice represented community values, any statutory reform ought reasonably to reflect that 
practice. 
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VII Assessing the Conflicts 
A The Ethics of Informed Consent 
The tension between the wishes of the deceased and the wishes of the surviving family is not 
endemic to New Zealand. In 1997, ethicist Eike-Henner Kluge published a short article on the 
state of organ donation laws in Canada.129  
Transplant societies had suggested that Canada reform their transplant laws to bring them in 
line with the French model of presumed consent. However, Kluge noted that “there [was] 
already a supply of organs available that [did] not require the establishment of a registry or a 
change in existing laws”.130 Namely, those patients who had explicitly consented to donation. 
While the relevant organ donation legislation provided that consent gave full legal authority 
for the retrieval of organs, Kluge noted that “almost without exception [consent] of the donor’s 
next of kin [was] required”.131 He cited guidelines prepared by an organ retrieval program in 
Ontario that stated “[i]f the next of kin refuse consent for organ and/or tissue donation their 
wishes must be respected.”132 Kluge’s findings were not unusual. In fact, this approach appears 
to be standard in most jurisdictions where individual consent provides legal authority for the 
removal of organs.133 
Kluge took exception to the protocols. Not only did he consider them a waste of precious 
resources and a flouting of the organ donation laws, but he also argued that they “[raised] 
serious ethical issues”.134 The transplant societies had argued that if they contravened the 
wishes of the family to collect organs, “they would be perceived as ghouls”.135 In response, 
Kluge reiterated the issue and asked: “Is it the potential donor who has the right to decide what 
shall happen to her/his body, or is it someone else? Does informed consent count, or doesn’t 
it?”136 He took a hard ethical line on the issue by concluding that “the [organ] shortage would 
not be as bad as it is if donated organs were in fact retrieved, if the wishes of potential donors 
were followed and if the ethics of informed consent were taken seriously.”137  
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While Kluge’s analysis represents a firm view on the issue, his position can fairly be criticised 
as being rather unsympathetic to the medical specialists tasked with organ retrieval, if not out 
of touch with the reality of the situation. However, his argument is persuasive academically, 
and it will be argued that the questions he raised were not adequately addressed during New 
Zealand’s reform process.  
B The Reality of End-of-life Care 
By way of contrast, in 2004, Stephen Streat, an intensivist in the critical care department at 
Auckland Hospital, presented a clinical review of the “moral assumptions” that underpinned 
organ donation within the ICU setting.138 In the review, Dr Streat argued that a utilitarian 
rational moral perspective pervaded the existing literature. Within such a perspective, he 
argued that the assumption was that increasing organ donation rates was the goal and gaining 
the consent of the surviving family was to be regarded as a “success”.  
In short, he suggested that the posture of the organ donation system was pro-collection, 
deriving from a sense that society is morally obligated to increase donation and that prospective 
recipients have some form of entitlement to donated organs. This perspective in turn lent the 
foundation for arguments asserting a higher “moral authority” in the wishes of the deceased 
donor, as compared with the surviving family.  
Streat challenged that assumption on the grounds that it was out of touch with the “interpersonal 
reality of the situation in which organ donation occurs”.139 He argued that it mistakenly places 
the focus on “the benefits that accrue to recipients of transplant organs”, when it should be on 
the conversation that occurs between the recently bereaved and a health professional.140  
As mentioned above, intensivists see care of the family as inextricably linked to the care of the 
patient. Therefore, to Streat, a “morally neutral” stance that allows the focus to shift from 
maximising the donation rate to “facilitating an informed family decision about organ donation, 
based on a robust understanding of all the relevant issues”, is how the process ought to be 
structured.141 
Interestingly, Streat argued that benefits would accrue to the transplant community under his 
approach. He contended that, through an acceptance that donation occurred in a non-coercive 
                                                                                                                                                 
138 Stephen Streat “Clinical review: Moral assumptions and the process of organ donation in the intensive care 
unit.” (2004) 8(5) Critical Care 382.  
139 At 384. 
140 At 384.  
141 At 386.  
36 
 
environment, donation rates would “accurately reflect” the level of societal support for the 
process. Although he acknowledged that a more coercive or “aggressively defended” system 
of honouring the wishes of the deceased might lead to higher rates of donation (by removing 
the decision and “sense of obligation” from the family), he argued that empirical data was 
needed to support any such theory.142 
Streat’s argument appears to take it for granted that the family’s wishes over the treatment of 
the deceased’s body should have primacy, or at least be on an equal footing. Doubtless, 
sympathy must be had for the situation that intensivists are put in when broaching the topic and 
managing an emotionally fraught situation. However, simply asserting that it is also the role of 
the intensivist to care for the family of the deceased fails to provide a convincing justification 
for subrogating the express wishes of a donor when they are known.  
Streat argued that by approaching the discussion as “offering the option”, the intensivist was 
free to act as an “honest broker”. Accordingly, they could pursue “the integrity [and] excellence 
of process, neutral to the donation outcome and respecting the legitimacy of the family 
decision.”143 
It was seen above that during the reform of the Human Tissue Act, the provision according 
paramountcy to the wishes of the deceased was removed, and the provision that established an 
authority not to collect inserted, mainly in response to the intensivists’ clinical practice. 
Therefore, the informal agreement, or agreed practice, was validated by the legislature, even if 
not converted into a binding legal rule. 
C Where Does That Leave Informed Consent? 
While an individual is alive, they have a right of control over their body. This basic right has a 
range of expressions, many of which will attract the protection of the law.144 That right will 
usually only be curtailed in exceptional circumstances. For present purposes, the most relevant 
expression is found in the concept of informed consent. 
The patient’s informed consent is paramount while they are alive. As was discussed above, this 
concept was central to the Cartwright Inquiry and the resulting Code of Health and Disability 
Services Consumers’ Rights. The medical profession, and the law, are both to hand to assist in 
upholding informed consent. In the medical context, the protection afforded to the autonomy 
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of the patient requires not only that services not be performed on patients without their 
informed consent, but also that such consent is sufficient to allow those services to be 
performed.  
The distinction is important. In the regulation of organ donation, it illustrates how the principle 
of informed consent broke down before the logical end point. While the Human Tissue Act 
purported to place informed consent at the centre of the regulatory regime, it was heavily 
curtailed by the legislative endorsement of the intensivists’ practice. The result is that the 
individual’s consent is protected to the extent that an express wish not to donate will be upheld, 
but an express wish to donate will not.   
If the regulatory objective was to enhance end of life care, understood as including the family 
of the deceased, a potential justification for contravening the informed consent of the donor 
arises. However, that debate simply was not had during the reform. As noted above, there were 
several competing regulatory objectives, and again it is asserted that failing to balance them 
obscured the essential issue of how informed consent should operate in the donation context. 
D The Māori Cultural Objection 
It is possible that the Māori Party’s ideological objection was based on a misconception of the 
way the law would work in practice. Without the knowledge that the intensivists’ practice 
would continue to demand family consent, upholding informed consent at the heart of the 
legislation might have appeared to threaten the collective interest the party spoke of.  
Nevertheless, their view suffers from a more fundamental flaw. It assumes that upholding the 
individual’s wishes is incompatible with tikanga Māori. However, it is not entirely clear that 
that follows. Even if individual consent was strictly upheld, it would only operate to the 
exclusion of the collective interest where the individual had made a positive decision for that 
to be so. In that respect, the individual rejects the collective interest, not the legislation.  
While it is true that the legislation allows this, it is no different than the way informed consent 
is upheld while the individual is alive. If a Māori individual has an appendectomy, for example, 
the collective interest may feel that the appendix ought to be committed to the earth as 
whakapapa material. However, that decision rests with the individual. They are free to honour 
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tikanga practice, or to reject it. In that respect, the legislation is culturally neutral, and good 
practice dictates that the individual simply be given the opportunity to make that decision.145 
Accordingly, it is argued that the legislation is compatible with tikanga Māori, but only where 
the individual so decides, either formally (by entrusting the decision to his or her family), or 
informally (by expressing no wishes on the matter and thereby triggering the legislative 
decision-making hierarchy for the next-of-kin). The position sought by the Māori Party would 
not have restored an equality that was lacking. Rather, it would have formally elevated the 
collective interest above that of the individual.  
Then Minister of Health, David Cunliffe MP, echoed these criticisms when he stated that he 
did not consider the Bill to be contrary to the Treaty of Waitangi. Mr Cunliffe continued:146 
The bill is, in my view, a permissive bill which establishes at a minimum the rights and 
responsibilities of the individual in respect of human tissue, but does not preclude the role 
of whānui in forming a collective decision that may influence the individual should that be 
appropriate. 
Pete Hodgson had earlier argued along similar lines when he said he considered that the Bill 
did not “preclude” the tikanga that the Māori Party MPs had spoken of. 147 
Clearly, the issue is of great significance to Māori, and there is no easy answer. However, that 
ought not logically to preclude upholding informed consent. It is up to Māori communities to 
determine the role of tikanga in donation practice. But it ought to be up to the individual to 
decide whether those views are shared.   
E Decision-making Process 
In 1997, Radecki and Jaccard published a review of the psychological aspects surrounding 
decisions to donate.148. Significantly, the review examined “consent” decisions; viz. the 
decision of the family whether or not to consent to the collection of the deceased next of kin’s 
organs. This category of consent decisions was subdivided into those situations where the 
deceased’s attitude toward donation was known and those where it was not. 
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The research indicated that in the former, the decision of the family generally followed the 
wishes of the deceased.149 However, it was noted that although individuals typically considered 
it important to discuss their views on organ donation with their families, it was a relatively rare 
occurrence in practice.150 
When the wishes of the deceased were not known, it was found that the consent decision 
depended on a complex interaction of variables, including the family’s own views toward 
donation, their ability to cope with stress, their views toward the medical profession and, 
crucially, the perceived sensitivity of medical specialists.151 The authors noted that “[f]amilies 
need to sense that their feelings have been acknowledged, and that they have received all 
pertinent medical information in a simple and sensitive matter, and that they will be assured 
private time with the deceased.”152 The “[p]erceived support of medical staff” was seen as 
“pivotal” to the decision to consent. When placed within the emotionally charged context 
produced by death, this highly contingent situation lends support to the intuition that 
intensivists and other medical staff seeking to broach the topic of collecting organs from the 
deceased are faced with an extremely delicate task.  
Alongside their own religious and cultural views, families were found to employ “attributional 
beliefs”, whereby the families used existing information such as the religious or altruistic 
beliefs of the deceased and his or her tendency to make provision for events that occurred after 
death, in order to determine the deceased’s likely attitude toward donation.153  
The research illustrated the importance of undertaking family discussions. While 93% of 
respondents to a survey reported that they would follow the express wishes of a deceased next 
of kin, the number that would consent to organ collection dropped to less than 50% when the 
wishes of the deceased were not known.154  
F Taking Away the Decision 
Very briefly, this section considers legislation where it has been deemed necessary, in the 
public interest, to make provision for the collection of human tissue without recourse to the 
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wishes of the surviving family. It is intended that this provide a contrast to the organ donation 
context in order to provoke consideration of two points.  
The first is that there does not appear to be any principled distinction between the following 
legal regimes and organ donation that justifies a different approach. The second is that it is 
arguable whether the public interest in the following situations is greater than the therapeutic 
benefit of increasing available organs. It is submitted that, consistent with the above arguments 
regarding informed consent, this latter point is a fortiori when the individual has consented to 
donation.  
1 Coroner’s post-mortem 
Under s 31 Coroners Act 2006, the coroner may direct that a post-mortem examination be 
performed for the reasons specified therein, having regard to the criteria set out in s 32. Under 
s 33, there is a right on the part of the surviving family “in some cases to object” to a post-
mortem directed under s 31. This right to object only accrues in circumstances where the 
coroner is, after having made all reasonable enquiry, satisfied that the death does not appear to 
have been the result of a crime and that no international or domestic legal obligations require 
the post-mortem to be performed.155  
Furthermore, the right does not accrue at all if the coroner decides that the particular facts of 
the case warrant urgent examination of the body.156 After the objection has been raised, the 
coroner may nevertheless direct that the post-mortem go ahead.157 The decision nevertheless 
to proceed can be challenged in the High Court within 48 hours by originating application.158 
Given that the right to object does not accrue in cases of urgency, it follows that in such 
circumstances, a High Court review of the decision would not be available at all.  
2 Criminal justice procedure 
Section 20 of the Human Tissue Act provides that informed consent is not required for the 
collection of human tissue in a range of situations.159 These include when the tissue is collected 
for criminal justice purposes;160 in order to implement an order of the Court;161 for the 
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performance of a post-mortem;162 for purposes of research approved by an ethics committee;163 
or for reasons of public health and safety.164 
VIII Smarter Regulation 
A The Essential Elements 
In the context of environmental regulation, Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky have 
attempted to synthesise key theoretical and pragmatic concepts in regulation in order to 
investigate how to arrive at an “optimal” mix of policy instruments.165 The authors stressed 
that the focus should be on the interrelationship of different regulatory approaches, and how 
different combinations of instruments affect the pursuit of regulatory objectives in various 
contexts.166  
They pointed out that regulatory solutions have often evolved in response to specific problems, 
rather than as part of a coherent, integrated system. As such, there was a tendency on the part 
of “policymakers [to fall] into the trap of simply adding a new instrument to their arsenal of 
weapons without giving sufficient thought to how this will impact on their overall regulatory 
strategy.”167 
The authors argued that, as well as the tendency to develop regulation in an “ad-hoc” manner, 
policymakers often viewed regulatory instruments as alternatives to one another.168 They 
argued that:169 
[A] better strategy [would] seek to harness the strengths of individual mechanisms while 
compensating for their weaknesses by the use of additional and complementary 
instruments…In the large majority of circumstances (though certainly not all), a mix of 
instruments is required, tailored to specific policy goals. 
In the context of environmental regulation, it was said that: 
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What is needed…is not simply the introduction of a broad range of policy instruments, but 
the matching of instruments with the imperatives of [the issue] being addressed, with the 
availability of different regulatory actors, and with the intrinsic qualities of each other. 
Gunningham and Grabosky set out three components that they believed were essential to 
smarter regulatory design. First, they introduced “regulatory design processes”, whereby 
policymakers are required to identify the regulatory objectives, characterise the “problem”, 
canvass the available options, and deal with issues of participation and consultation.170  
Secondly, they identified a set of regulatory principles that must underpin successful regulatory 
design. The most relevant of these for present purposes were favouring complementary 
mechanisms over “single instrument approaches”, reducing interventionist measures, 
empowering “surrogate regulators” to allow redeployment of government resources and 
maximising the “opportunities for win-win outcomes”.171 
Thirdly, the authors encouraged emphasis on addressing how the available regulatory 
instruments will work in combination with one another. 
B Smarter Organ Donation Regulation 
As was argued above, the reform involved a range of competing regulatory objectives. In terms 
of Gunningham and Grabosky’s “smarter design processes”, there were several deficiencies. 
First, as already discussed, the failure to acknowledge that the regulatory targets conflicted 
obstructed any meaningful discussion regarding how the objectives ought to be ranked or how 
to deal with the conflicting interests in the system. This meant it was unclear what the 
legislation was supposed to achieve. The regulatory “problem” was poorly characterised.  
Early in the reform, the problem appeared to be that the individual’s wishes could be 
overridden, which was inconsistent with the principle of informed consent. This was seen to 
coincide with the problem of New Zealand’s poor rate of donation. However, by the end of the 
reform process, the regulatory problem was difficult to ascertain. It is submitted that this 
resulted from the failure to keep informed consent at the centre of the debate, as was urged by 
Jonathan Coleman MP during the Bill’s third reading.172  
If the regulatory problem was poorly characterised, arriving at the necessary response was 
always going to be problematic. This was confirmed by the modification of the legislation that 
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attempted to accommodate the competing positions. Quite apart from striking a balance, it 
simply reinstated the pre-reform position. Ironically, the Māori party’s Supplementary Order 
Paper formally prioritising the rights of the surviving family was voted down 10 votes to 109, 
only for that position to be established de facto by the operation of the eventual Act.173 
Had the Government kept their sights on the informed consent issue, it would have forced a 
discussion of a range of issues. For example, the attitude of the intensivists would have come 
under greater scrutiny. Their approach rests on the assumption that society would disapprove 
of enforcing the wishes of the deceased against the wishes of the family. This may not be 
correct. If it was demonstrated not to be correct, the reform process would likely have taken a 
considerably different course. Given the inherent conflict in the intensivist’s role, the obvious 
solution would have been to take the problematic organ donation conversation away from them 
in favour of a medical professional who was prepared to assert the interests of the donor. With 
the endorsement of the public, this might have been an acceptable solution.  
The characterisation of the regulatory instruments in the donation setting also demonstrates the 
difficulty in arriving at the optimal regulatory solution. As was seen above, deceased organ 
donation engages a number of diverse instruments. If the discussion of informed consent 
allowed a line to be drawn in the sand, it would have dictated what weight ought to be accorded 
to each instrument, based on its appropriateness in securing the regulatory objective. In 
addition, the benefits and shortcomings of each instrument would have been able to be balanced 
in a cooperative way to further the regulatory objective. 
Instead, the various instruments all met somewhere in the middle. For example, the command 
provisions that provided sanctions against the medical staff converged with the legislative 
endorsement of the intensivists’ consensus practice in a manner that logically led to a more 
defensive position. The legislation threatened to punish them for getting it wrong, but expressly 
said they were justified in not proceeding at all.   
C Participation and Awareness 
An appropriate first step for addressing the informed consent issue would have been through 
increasing public participation.  At times during the passage of the Bill, it appeared that a lack 
of clarity surrounding the expectations of the public paralysed the debate over whose wishes 
ought to be prioritised in the donation setting.  
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Public participation in a regulatory process secures legitimacy. It flows from the wider 
democratic concept that those who are affected by a decision-making process ought to be 
afforded the opportunity to participate in it.174  
In addition to assisting the resolution of the informed consent issue, Mark Bennett and Joel 
Colón-Ríos have argued that increased public participation secures more general benefits. 
These include: increasing accountability and assessing the regulator’s decisions; providing 
educational benefits for the public and the regulators; increasing the quality of the outcomes; 
and upholding democratic justifications.175 
The educational benefits that derive from increased participation are especially relevant to the 
organ donation context. Issues of awareness are related to issues of participation. The fact that 
people were generally unaware of the ineffectiveness of the driver’s licence system was an 
awareness issue. The fact that people might be unaware that their informed consent may be 
overridden by their surviving family is also an awareness issue. Bennett and Colón-Ríos argued 
that educational benefits have the effect of producing a more informed citizenry, who are better 
versed in their rights.176 They also argued that:177 
If more people are allowed to participate in a decision-making process and if, by 
participating, they gain a “sophisticated technical and social understanding” of the relevant 
issues and of the ways different solutions might impact their own communities or different 
sectors of society, it is likely that the quality of the substantive outcomes will be improved. 
Furthermore, they noted that:178 
By being exposed to the views of interested citizens and groups, it becomes easier for [the 
regulatory decision-makers] to explain the reasons behind policies which might at first sight 
appear unpopular to the electorate. 
It is submitted that an increased emphasis on public participation might have helped to orientate 
the reform process. Part of the problem during the debate of the Bill was that the minority views 
of the Māori party and the National party were diametrically opposed. Public opinion pointing 
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one way or another might have shaken the debate free from this ideological stalemate and 
enabled the Government to take a definitive stance on the issue.  
In keeping with the arguments above, it is submitted that this would have had positive flow on 
effects in the form of the legislation. Whether the legislation would have been vastly different 
is unclear. In principle, there seems to be no reason why informed consent should cease to 
operate at death. However, at the very least, forcing the issue into the spotlight and drawing on 
public participation would have ensured that whatever the eventual legislation, it would have 
resulted from a contested and representative value judgement, rather than a poorly executed 
reform process.   
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IX Looking Forward 
A Statistics 
As can be seen from the following table, the Human Tissue Act has not had a significant effect 
on the deceased donation rate:179  
 
Furthermore, a recent audit of deaths in the ICU in New Zealand identified issues in the 
relationship between deaths in the ICU and organ donation.180 Between 2008 and 2012, the 
number of patients who died with severe brain damage while ventilated in ICU was 1,745. Of 
those deaths, organ donation was formally discussed in only 381 instances (20%).181  
According to Dr James Judson, the data demonstrated that “[there was] unexplained variance 
[among ICUs] in mention of donation, discussion of donation, discussion with ODNZ [and] 
brain death testing.”182 Furthermore, the data also showed that “[there] must be missed 
opportunities for organ donation [within the population of ICU deaths]”.183 
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New Zealand website <http://www.donor.co.nz>. It should be noted that decreases in serious road collisions and 
advances in management of critical care patients have likely reduced the pool of potential donors. Nevertheless, 
the statistics indicate that a substantial increase in donation rate has not been effected by the Human Tissue Act 
2008.  
180 Organ Donation New Zealand The ICU Death Audit (25 November 2014).   
181 Organ Donation New Zealand, above n 180, at 9.  
182 Organ Donation New Zealand, above n 180, at 15. 
183 Organ Donation New Zealand, above n 180, at 15. 
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B NEAC Report 
Earlier this year, the National Ethics Advisory Committee published a review of ethical issues 
surrounding the access to organ transplantation for waiting list patients.184 Considering the 
significant impact that a donated organ has for a patient who requires one, and the severe 
shortage of organs for transplantation, the NEAC considered it “important to review the 
processes for determining who receives an organ and assess whether they were fair, transparent 
and robust.”185 
The NEAC’s report identified issues with “equity of access to living and deceased donor 
transplantation”, the “application of ethical principles to the processes for listing patients and 
allocating deceased donor organs”, and “deceased donor list numbers for kidney 
transplants”.186  
Specifically, the equity of access issue revealed that Māori and Pacific Island patients were less 
likely to receive a transplant than New Zealand European patients. It should be noted that the 
equity of access issue for ethnic minorities is not restricted to the New Zealand context.187   
Regarding the application of ethical principles to transplant decisions, the Committee stated 
that the key principles that ought to guide clinical decisions allocating scarce organs were the 
likely outcome, need and urgency, and equity.188 However, issues were identified regarding 
how these principles were being applied in transplant decisions, and how they were 
balanced.189 For example, it was unclear how a patient ought to be ranked if there was a good 
prospect of survival but the patient had not been on the waiting list for very long.190 The 
Committee argued that “allocation decisions need to be ethically defensible, as deceased donor 
(and non-directed living donor) organs are a community-held resource.”191 
Finally, the report identified a narrow ethical issue concerning the management of deceased 
donor list numbers.192 As at January 2015, there were 600 people on the waiting list for a kidney 
transplant. The Committee noted that around 170 patients were added to this list each year, 
                                                                                                                                                 
184 National Ethics Advisory Committee Ethical Issues Relating to Access to Organ Transplantation: NEAC 
Report to the Associate Minister of Health (20 January 2015).  
185 At 2.  
186 At 3.  
187 See, for example, Dean M. Harris Healthcare Law and Ethics (3rd ed, Health Administration Press, Chicago, 
2008) at 230.  
188 At 5.  
189 At 7-8. 
190 At 8.  
191 At 8. 
192 At 9-10.  
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whereas only 110 transplants were performed. By contrast, other countries such as Australia 
demonstrated a transplant rate that exceeded waiting list additions. The Committee noted that 
some patients on the waiting list in fact had a very poor prospect of receiving an organ, but 
would not be aware of this. Accordingly, it was suggested that the “false hope” given to such 
patients was a potential ethical issue. 
The significance of the NEAC report is that it demonstrates that the shortage issue may be even 
more severe than it first appeared. If New Zealand’s regulation of deceased organ donation 
results in a system with sub-optimal collection rates, the need for transplantation processes to 
be ethically and clinically sound is even stronger. 
C Financial Assistance for Live Donors Bill 
In 2015, a bill was drawn from the ballot that purported to bolster the financial assistance given 
to live altruistic organ donors. The Bill was claimed to be a partial means of addressing New 
Zealand’s low rate of organ donation.193 
The Bill seeks to establish an ACC-style compensation scheme for live donors that will 
partially compensate foregone income during the donor’s convalescence. The Bill explicitly 
noted it was: 
[N]ot intended that the support provided to donors be material enough such that ambivalent 
or financially straightened citizens might be motivated to donate when otherwise they 
would not… [Rather,] it eases the financial stress on those who will do so solely for 
altruistic reasons. 
Therefore, it avoids the ethical minefield of providing financial consideration for donated 
organs.  
Intuitively, an ACC-style system of compensation seems a reasonable way to counteract one 
hurdle that prospective donors face. As noted at the outset of this paper, the vast majority of 
patients on the waiting list for organs are in need of a kidney. The statistics of transplant 
operations in New Zealand also demonstrate that roughly the same number of kidneys proceed 
from live donors as deceased donors each year: 
                                                                                                                                                 
193 In the Bill’s explanatory note it states “New Zealand has one of the lowest rates of organ donation in the 
Western World. There are a number of reasons for this, but one of them is the financial barrier to live donation. 
This Bill addresses that barrier.”  
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The policy initiative is obviously a valuable one, provided of course that it actually has the 
effect of boosting donation rates. However, research has called into question the efficacy of 
financial incentives in influencing individuals’ decision to donate.194 Given the explicit goal of 
raising donation rates, the merits of the proposed compensation scheme are almost entirely 
contingent on demonstrating that the financial hardship imposed on live donors is a significant 
reason for electing not to donate.   
By contrast, as was argued forcefully by Kluge, there is already a potential pool of donors 
whose consent is obtained or obtainable, yet collection is being blocked through the way the 
system is structured.   
The Government will need to be careful to avoid falling into the trap, warned against by 
Gunningham and Grabosky above, of simply bringing new regulatory tools into the mix 
without consideration of the bigger picture. The subsequent inclusion of a financial assistance 
regime for live donors runs the risk of being an addition of an ad-hoc instrument aimed at 
addressing a specific problem, without consideration of its impact on the overall regulatory 
strategy, save for an assumption that it will help.195 
Furthermore, setting up an ACC-style compensation scheme for live donors will require a 
significant financial investment from the State, and the question of whether those funds would 
be better employed in addressing the inherent issues in the regulation of deceased organ 
donation should certainly form part of the debate surrounding the proposed Bill. 
                                                                                                                                                 
194 Radecki and Jaccard, above n 76, at 185.  
195 Above n 193.  
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X Conclusion 
The Act made some useful improvements on the pre-2008 law. Cleaning up the consent 
provisions regarding who could consent on behalf of the deceased was a necessary step. It was 
noted that this was an extremely technical legislative task, and the resulting legislative 
hierarchy is fairly sound in that regard.196 Furthermore, the driver licence registration system 
was in dire need of phasing out. It did not amount to informed consent, and the public was 
generally unaware of this, yet it was the generally accepted means of recording one’s wishes. 
It was counterproductive.  
However, what was lacking in the reform was a meaningful discussion of informed consent 
and its operation in the donation setting. It was taken for granted that the family had at least an 
equal interest in the disposition of the deceased’s remains. That view did not rest on any real 
public participation justification. Rather, it resulted from a compromise reached by 
accommodating the professional views of intensivists and the clash of views represented most 
strongly by the National Party and the Māori Party.  
The failure adequately to frame the regulatory objectives was related to this deficiency in the 
reform. Without clearly framing those targets, it was unclear which of the various regulatory 
instruments was most appropriate. As a result, several instruments were deployed, with little 
explicit consideration of what the consequences of their cooperation would be.  
If public participation had made it clear that the expectation was for individual wishes to be 
upheld, a command-based reform regulating the intensivists was inappropriate. As was seen, 
they were adamant that their clinical practice would be unaffected by legislative direction.  
With public sanction, it might have been considered appropriate to put in place a “grim reaper” 
of organs who was prepared to assert the interests of the deceased. If medical professionals are 
prepared to assert the authority of the coroner in the public interest, why not also for organ 
donation? Such an approach would at least be consistent with the principle of informed consent. 
Alternatively, a “softer” approach might have been called for.197 
                                                                                                                                                 
196 (13 November 2007) 643 NZPD 13053. 
197 In 2010, Jurgen De Wispelaere and Lindsay Stirton proposed an excellent alternative to the status quo for 
deceased organ donation. They did not attempt to divorce the view of the deceased’s surviving family from the 
equation, but rather focussed on improving the process of engaging in the “consent” discussion. Their solution 
was to allow the donor to appoint a “designated second consenter” (DSC) who formally agrees to uphold the 
donor’s decision after the donor’s death. Under this system, the DSC, usually familiar to the surviving family, 
represents the interests of the donor. Not only does this provide a more constructive “deliberative space”, but it 
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Similarly, if the interests of the potential donees had been elevated, a different course would 
have been appropriate. As was seen above, other legislation, and the Human Tissue Act itself, 
had made it clear that certain public interests could justify dispensing with the requirement for 
informed consent. A question that was not debated at all during the reform was whether the 
therapeutic benefit of increased organ collection was one of those public interests. The case for 
this argument could only have been a fortiori when the donor had consented as well. Again, 
public endorsement of such a view would have allowed the legislature to act boldly and put in 
place a law that actually broke new ground.  
Instead, New Zealand was left with a compromise position that sidesteps the issue. It provides 
legislative endorsement of the intensivists practice to ascribe de facto paramountcy to the 
wishes of the surviving family. However, this is simply a reinstatement of the default position 
not to donate, which was flagged early on in the reform as a key issue. The wishes of the 
individual are thrown to the uncertainties of grief and the tact of the medical staff.  
Without a convincing and principled justification, this is an unsatisfactory situation. If the 
Government wishes to make any real improvement on New Zealand’s poor rate of donation, it 
must first ascertain whether a system that is postured against collection actually finds favour 
with the public. Aside from this, a decision that has the effect of subrogating the express wishes 
of the donor, wishes that might represent the last significant decision they were able to make 
in their life, must at least have a principled justification.  
Lastly, it should be noted that these issues are only likely to become more pressing as the 
population and prevalence of end-stage renal and liver diseases continue to rise.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
also relieves the medical professionals from their conflicted role. See: Jurgen De Wispelaere and Lindsay Stirton 
“Advance commitment: an alternative approach to the family veto problem in organ procurement” (2010) 36 J 
Med Ethics 180. 
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